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Archive for the ‘Economics & Financing’ Category

Making Health Reform Work

By Michael D. Miller MD
May 6th, 2010

The May issue of Health Affairs focuses on Reinventing Primary Care - a topic that has been part of health policy discussions for at least 20 years. A few things have changed in that time: now there is better evidence about the importance of primary care providers in coordinating care to improve quality and reduce costs; the structural concept of this care coordination has been codified under the new term the “Patient Centered Medical Home,” (which has also been given precise parameters by NCQA); the complexity of medical care has increased so that the need for care coordination is greater; and electronic information storage, analysis, and communications technologies have been developed which - in theory - should make care coordination and the resultant quality improvement and cost control easier and more practical.

Health Affairs held a briefing on Tuesday about their May issue at the National Press Club.  Keynoting the meeting was HHS Secretary Sebelius. She rightly pointed out that healthcare delivery in the US is a “truly broken system.”  Her remarks touched on the various parts of the new health reform law that would help fix what’s broken, but the reality is that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) is very heavily weighted toward health insurance/financing reform, with comparatively little addressing delivery system reform.  Similarly, the Health Affairs articles are very heavy on the situation with primary care, the problems with our delivery system, and what a reformed (or transformed) delivery system should look like, but aside from reimbursement reforms, the articles have very little about how to achieve this transformation.

No “How” to go along with the “Who,” “What,” “When,” and “Why”
Like a good news story, a successful reform initiative needs to address the basic concepts of Who, What, Why, When, and How.  Unfortunately, the “How” part is frequently missing or minimal in most health policy discussions and proposals - aside from financial rearrangements. This heavy emphasis on financial incentives is because government programs like Medicare and Medicaid are significantly limited in what they can change outside their payment amounts and methodologies. And in the private sector, changing financial incentives is also the easiest thing to do.  In other words, changing reimbursements and other financial incentives, (such as pay-for-performance or bonus payments), is the lever most often used because it is the one that policy leaders are most familiar with, and it is the easiest for them to pull or push.

Challenges of Reorganizing the Unmotivated
Even though transforming healthcare delivery is based upon reorganizing the structure of healthcare delivery there has been very little focus on how to actually get physicians to participate in this reorganization.  While economists and others keep pointing to the economic incentives lever, it is pretty clear that physicians are not interested in reorganizing for the sake of improving their incomes. David Rotherman’s review of Timothy Hoff’s book about primary care physicians’ practices at the back of the Health Affairs May issue discusses how physicians like the current situation and their incomes. In this review he notes that it doesn’t appear that “primary care physicians have substantial dissatisfaction with the current system or levels of pay,” and that, “They seem comfortable as pieceworkers, not professionals.”

Thus, while policy researchers and payers correctly describe the great need for and value in delivery system reform, those actually delivering care seem to like many parts of the system - particularly their steady income stream and ability to run their own operations.  And while delivery system integration could solve many things clinicians don’t like - such as insurance and paperwork hassles - convincing them that working in a larger organization will significantly improve their lives is a difficult concept to sell. The challenge here is to overcome the inertia of change and getting them to consider the value of shifting from the “devil that they know.”

Private Medical Practices are Small Businesses
Another way to look at this is to see primary care physicians as small businesspeople.  As Boedneheim and Pham illustrate in their Health Affairs article, “Primary Care: Current Problems and Proposed Solutions,” 88% of primary care physicians are in practices with 5 or fewer physicians: 32% in solo practice, 14% in two person practices, and 32% in groups with 3-5 physicians.

What distinguishes these small businesses from non-medical enterprises is that because reimbursement systems using fee schedules create fee-for-service volume incentives, these physicians have very few business incentives to change.  Since their businesses are generally making a profit, and most physicians’ training and skills are not in running an efficient business, they few reasons to change their businesses operations.  While classic economic theory would disagree with that statement, and posit that their incentive should be to improve efficiency to increase profits, the reality is that people don’t like change - and they generally need to believe there there will be a 2:1 return for their financial or psychological investment before they are willing to undertake changes.  And small business practicing physicians don’t want to make those changes because they are concerned that no matter what the policy rhetoric states, they believe that any changes will decrease their income.

In addition, physicians generally believe that proposed health delivery transformation changes will reduce their autonomy - something they may value as high, or higher, than their income since it may be one of the reasons they became physicians, it may be why they are practicing in a small group or solo practice, and autonomy of clinical decisions is part of how physicians are trained.

Conclusions - How to Go About Achieving Health Transformation
Transforming healthcare delivery in the US will not be as simple as paying more for primary care services, and/or training more primary care clinicians, and/or training all physicians to work in team-based environments rather than as autonomous clinicians.  While all those are good things that certainly should be done, reforming how clinicians are trained will take 20-30 years to produce significant changes in the makeup of the US clinician workforce - and maybe even longer to change the ratio of primary care to specialty practitioners.

Therefore, what is needed is more emphasis on non-financial levers that can be used to alter physicians’ attitudes and actions around improving healthcare delivery - including their immediate practice situations, and how they relate to other providers and their patients.  Changing financial incentives can certainly support this, but it is very unlikely to successfully produce these changes in isolation.

Rather, some of the general principles involving the adoption of innovations should be applied to bring physicians - and other community care leaders - to be more receptive and participatory in making delivery transformation both a reality and a success. These principles, (as described by researchers in the 70s and 80s), have been applied to improving the quality of hospital care by organizations like the Institute for Healthcare Improvement, and include providing information about how simple the proposed changes are and how comparable they are to the clinicians existing day-to-day actions, and making it possible for clinicians to observe and/or try out these changes before they have to adopt them.

One of the major catalysts for using these principles to successfully implement reforms is to use change agents to communicate the value and reality of the proposed practice changes, and to simultaneously diffuse misconceptions and fears about them.  Since the old adage about physicians is that you can tell them, but you can’t tell them much, the best change agents for leading physicians through this transformation are other physicians who have participated in and/or observed, and/or analyzed other practices that have gone through similar changes.  There are also two caveats about these change agent leaders.  First, they need to be seen as independent and not biased or conflicted for financial or other reasons.  And second, they must be able to culturally and geographically connect to the clinicians they are trying to educate and lead.  For example, information about practice transformations in Vermont aren’t going to have much traction with physicians in Texas, nor are the experiences of Philadelphia practices going to carry much weight with physicians in rural Illinois.

Afterward: “Making Health Reform Work” Book Project
These concepts and messages about care delivery transformation using the principles of innovation adoption and stakeholder engagement are at the core of what I’ve been trying to construct into a book containing logical and understandable prose and graphics.  The working title for the book is “Making Health Reform Work.” However, the passage of health reform and its impending implementation have overtaken my ability to finish it. Therefore, I wanted to put forward some of these ideas here to stimulate more discussion about these issues and concepts because I strongly believe that without a broad based and balanced approach to health delivery transformation, significant efforts and money will produce suboptimal results and leave a bad precedent for future transformation and quality improvement efforts.

Health Care Reform (PPACA): By the Numbers and Political Battles Over Numbers

By Michael D. Miller MD
May 3rd, 2010

A week ago I ran into a long-time Republican health policy expert who was very excited about the Memorandum the CMS Chief Actuary had released on April 22nd about the financial effects of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).  He was very excited because he believes that the Memo has significant information that will support repeal of the new health reform law when the Republicans take over one or both houses of Congress next year.  (FYI - Current credible speculation puts the House as a toss up for Republican control in 2011, but the Senate is less likely to switch party control.)

Having reviewed the Actuary’s report I don’t think it has dramatically new information, or orbit altering analyses.  However, it does provide some insights into the new health reform law and how the political discourse about it may play out over the coming months - and possibly years.

First, Rick Foster, the Chief Actuary at CMS, is very clear about the difficulties and uncertainties of estimating the impact of the new law.  He specifically states at the end of the Summary:

“The actual future impacts of the PPACA on health expenditures, insured status, individual decisions, and employer behavior are very uncertain.  The legislation would result in numerous changes in the way health care insurance is provided and paid for in the U.S., and the scope and magnitude of these changes are such that few precedents exist for use in estimation.  Consequently, the estimates presented here are subject to a substantially greater degree of uncertainty than is usually the case with more routine health care legislation.” [emphasis added]

And the “Caveats and Limitations of Estimates” section of the memo includes 11 bullet points, one of which states: “Due to very substantial challenges inherent in modeling nation health reform legislation, our estimates will vary from other experts and agencies.  Differences in results from one estimating entity to another may tend to cause confusion among policy makers. [emphasis added]  These differences, however, provide a useful reminder that all such estimates are uncertain and that actual future impacts could differ significantly from the estimates of any given organization.  Indeed, the future costs and coverage effects could lie outside of the range of estimates provided by the various estimators.”

This second paragraph directly addresses how the CMS Actuary’s April report differs from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) March estimates.  Without going into technical details, there are two important things to note in comparing the two analyses.  First, CBO estimates focus on Federal spending, while the CMS Actuary looks at national health expenditures.  Both are important, valid, and useful, but different.  And second, looking at insurance coverage, the CMS Actuary found that the PPACA would be more effective at reducing the number of people without insurance and in getting people covered under Medicaid, while causing less disruption of employer sponsored benefits.  Specifically, compared to the CBO’s analysis the Actuary concluded that in the year 2019:

  • More people would get insurance (33.8 million v. 32 million according to CBO - although their baseline numbers also differ so they both estimate that there will be ~23 million people without insurance in 2019);
  •  Employer provided health benefits would decrease by 1.4 million people v. 3 million according to CBO’s estimates;
  • Medicaid enrollment would increase by 20.4 million v.16 million in CBO’s assessment;
  • The number of the people in getting their insurance through the new Insurance Exchanges would be 31.6 million v. 24 million according to CBO’s estimates.

So overall, it could be concluded that the CMS Actuary estimates that the new law would be slightly more effective in improving coverage than what CBO had estimated.

Outlook for Individual Costs and Cost Control Still Cloudy
Unfortunately, what neither of the analyses provide are estimates of how much actual insurance premiums will increase over the next 10 years.  Lack of control over spending growth is a generally agreed upon weakness in the new law, and the almost certain increase in insurance premiums and overall health spending will at the core of potent political arguments about the new law and how it should be modified, built upon and/or repealed.

Political Battling With Numbers
Reports - like those from the CMS Actuary and CBO - will provide nuggets of numerical information that will be turned into sound bites flung in the political-rhetorical skirmishes that will play out in the coming months - and probably years.

Updates to this “numbers game” will fuel future political firestorm since they will almost certainly contain higher cost estimates than the recent ones from CBO and the Actuary because they will be shifting the 10 year cost window from 2010-19 to 2011-20.  That is, replacing 2010 - when very little of the new law was in effect - with 2020 - when all the provisions are scheduled to be implemented - will dramatically raise the dollar estimates, possibly in the $100 billion range.  While comparing the 2010-19 years with the 2011-20 years is certainly an apples-to-oranges comparison, for political sound-bite purposes it is like hitting a baseball off a batting T - just because it isn’t relevant to the actual (policy or healthcare reform) game, doesn’t matter if it leads to a huge (political) hit.

Conclusions
What does this all mean? It means that health reform will continue to be a huge political hot potato, and different groups will claim it is fried, baked, scalloped, au gratin, from Idaho, Maine, California, etc….. Basically whatever suits the group’s political purpose at the time, because within all the reports and numbers and variables in  implementation, there will be quantitative and qualitative data, (of good and other quality), to justify their positions and sound bites.

To counteract the inevitable political rhetoric, government agencies ranging from HHS, Treasury, and in every State will need to be rapidly and effectively implementing the many provisions of the new law. Right now, many people are scrambling as the marathon of health reform legislation has turned into the sprint (without end in sight) of implementation.  As the CMS Actuary has described, the actual results of the implementation of the new law could be very different from even the best estimates.  It is the goal of the legions of people inside government agencies and within private companies to try and make the results as good as possible, i.e. the most people covered with health insurance, at the lowest cost, with the highest quality.

At the same time, there will certainly be problems encountered along the way. And it will be the responsibly of Congress to be vigilant in listening to government officials and people in the private sector about these real-world problems, so they can modify the law and redirect resources to address these problems and maximize the value of the new law.  At least that’s the way it’s supposed to work. Whether politics gets in the way, and maneuvering for control of Congress, positioning for 2012 elections, or strategizing for market share complicates this process remains to be seen.

Hang On Tight
Implementing health reform, even for those driving the process, may be more like trying to steer a rocket sled than a 737.  So, as I’ve said before, hang on and make sure your seat belt is tightly fastened.

The Internet Solves Everything in Healthcare - - - NOT

By Michael D. Miller MD
April 23rd, 2010

Improving healthcare will require people having better information.  That concept is generally agreed upon.  The challenge is getting the right information to the right people at the right time.  That is the interconnected goal of different facets of health information technology - from EMRs and PHRs, to health information exchanges.

People Are Complex
However, the complexity of medical care and individual variability - both human physiology and patient preferences - makes collecting and analyzing health information so that it is useful for individual clinical decisions much more difficult than presenting information about TVs, computers or cameras on a website such as CNET.

However, that distinction is not apparent to a friend of a friend who I had dinner with recently.  This person told me how the internet will solve everything in healthcare by making quality information from patients available to everyone else so that drugs don’t need to be approved by the FDA and doctors don’t need to be licensed. He also believes that this full access to information from other people about the quality of every health care option - from specific medicines to individual surgeons - will make health insurance unnecessary, since people will be able to decide what they want to pay for based upon how high a quality of care they want to obtain.

As a polite dinner guest of a friend I didn’t argue with his Libertarian perspectives.  Rather I tried to point out the complexity of analyzing health information because of different patient specific factors, and why risk adjustment is very difficult in assessing the quality of any healthcare option.  For example, I mentioned the piece I wrote last winter about a study of different assessments of hospital quality in Massachusetts, and how this showed the difficulty of exactly what this person believed should be easy and currently possible, e.g. if you were a patient in Massachusetts trying to decide which hospital you should  go to for a specific condition, how would you decide.  As I noted then, the different quality assessments came to conflicting conclusions.

Profit Seeking Isn’t Always A Good Thing
I also noted how the profit motive can lead unscrupulous people to sell fake medicines that can actually do more harm than no treatment at all - such as fake anti-malarial pills containing aspirin, which don’t treat the malaria but do reduce the fever so people think they are getting better. Similarly, the concept of modern snake oil salesmen taking advantage of people’s hope was reinforced by a recent cartoon in the New Yorker showing two people looking at a display of pill bottles adorned with a sign saying “As seen on TV,” and the caption reads, “The active ingredient is marketing.”

However, I found my insights didn’t make much of an impression, and I did make a faux pas by pointing out that there was $1.1 Billion in last year’s stimulus bill for research to get more of this type of information and make it available to people.  Unfortunately, this fact only elicited a shaking head in hands response which I took as his disgust at more wasted government/taxpayer money.

“Living is Easy With Eyes Closed, Misunderstanding All You See”
While for those of us not blinded by the limited wonders of computers and the internet, and who understand the complexity of actual healthcare decisions and analyses, the challenge is communicating this reality to people who believe that the internet is rapidly solving all our information problems…… As a society our goal should be to convey this knowledge to people before they or a family member becomes seriously ill - at which point the complexity of making healthcare decisions will be immediate and personal.  And just as there are no atheists in foxholes, people facing serious life altering medical decisions want validated and reliable information, not subjective, anonymous opinions from the internet - which may be fine for picking a restaurant, but is certainly problematic for picking a surgeon or a medicine.

Regulating Insurance: States v. Federal Roles

By Michael D. Miller MD
March 18th, 2010

One of the fascinating issues within the health reform debate is how to improve the insurance market by changing government regulations.  While large employers who self-insure are except from state regulations, (and must only conform to limited Federal rules under ERISA), individuals, small groups, and others who actually purchase insurance have their policies regulated by individual states.

Both Democrats and Republicans agree that the current system of insurance regulation creates job lock and other socially undesirable effects, and that insurance companies should be able to sell policies across states lines.  However, their solutions are quite different.

Democrats favor national regulation to create a single playing field, and Republicans prefer permitting insurance companies to sell in multiple or all states if they are licensed and regulated in any state.  The insurance industry’s trade association (AHIP), doesn’t seem to take a firm position on this issue - at least from looking at their website.

However, I was surprised to see a full page ad from an individual company on the back cover of a recent issue of National Journal advocating for national rules to replace state insurance regulation.  This interesting ad included the following phrases:

“Something’s wrong when…. innovation surpasses…. insurance regulation.”

“Here’s something to bristle at: the regulatory system that shapes our…. insurance policies hasn’t changed much in the last century.  Yet everything …. has changed dramatically…… Chrome and steel have given way to thermoplastic and fiberglass.”

And the company’s recommendations for solutions focus on increasing national regulations:

“Today there are 50 different sets of insurance regulations in 50 states.  This makes it difficult to introduce innovative new products.  But with a modern system of national regulation, consumers would get to choose from the best products available nationwide.”

“National regulation would help spread risk more fairly across similar geographic areas.”

“Modern regulation is the kind of protection Americans deserve.”

However, the caveat here is that this ad is talking about regulation of car insurance and not health insurance.  In fact, the specific company doesn’t even sell comprehensive health insurance - so they don’t have a dog, cat or Cadillac plan in that fight.

What is also interesting is the parallel developments and history in the State of Massachusetts with health and auto insurance. Everyone following the debate about health reform has certainly heard what Massachusetts has done with health insurance reform and mandates to achieve near universal coverage.  However, in roughly the same time-frame the state also reformed its auto insurance regulations to enable national insurers to enter the market.  This increased competition resulted in dramatic decreases in premiums - but the insurance plans are still regulated by the state.

How changing the regulation of selling health insurance would change costs and affect consumer protections is open to debate.  Unfortunately as an “issue” it has been overshadowed in the health reform discussions by other aspects such as the so-called public option, abortion coverage, coverage of immigrants, costs to individuals, effects on the Federal deficit, and mandates for having insurance. Thus Federal v. State insurance regulation - which is really a core part of health reform - hasn’t been a big part of the national political debate, even though changing insurance company practices has been a large part of the Democrats’ messaging.  Despite that, there are several interesting points to consider:

  1. Insurance companies operate on a business model very similar to financial institutions, such as banks, in that they seek to manage risk and they make most of their money on the “float” - or interest earned - based upon having large amounts of money for a period of time between collecting premiums and having to pay for covered benefits… and deductibles also adds a delay to these payments, which creates a cushion to the float.  Therefore, because their revenues are tied to their interest earnings, the lower the prevailing interest rates the lower their earnings - and thus the more they need to raise premiums… and vice versa.  (I did an analysis several years ago showing that premium increases were directly correlated with interest rate fluctuations, but delayed a year or two.)  This parallelism with banks raises the question about why it is OK to Federally regulate banks, but not health insurance companies? How much more important is it to protect people’s money than their health insurance coverage?
  2. National insurance regulation would help address both job lock for individuals within companies that purchased insurance directly, and location lock for small businesses and entrepreneurs - particularly those operating service businesses where location may not be as crucial as manufacturing or retail operations.
  3. Permitting the selling of insurance across state lines based upon licensing in one state would probably result in reduced consumer protections since some states have less oversight and requirements than others about marketing, coverage guarantees, etc.
  4. And neither national rules from the Federal government or allowing selling across state lines would significantly affect the growth in health case costs or insurance premiums, i.e. they wouldn’t really bend the cost curve.  Although allowing selling across states lines could reduce premiums in certain higher cost states, but that would be due to people being able to by insurance policies with less coverage or intrinsic protections.  In some ways this would follow the old saying, “you get what you pay for.”
  5. And since the consensus is that bending the cost curve will require changing how health care is actually delivered to patients, (which makes sense since ~80+% of health care spending goes to pay for health care goods and services), this discussion makes me wonder how differential state regulation of doctors and healthcare providers fit into this equation?  While laws and legal procedures may vary among states, presumably the practice of medicine shouldn’t vary dramatically…. Although many studies have shown that it does so in ways that can’t be explained by demographic differences or regional variations in disease states such as Lyme disease. I’m not certain how changing the way clinicians are licensed would improve healthcare delivery or costs, but it is another aspect of State v. Federal regulation that is becoming an increasingly contentious issue - as was pointed out in an article in today’s New York Times.

Missing Pieces of Health Reform

By Michael D. Miller MD
February 23rd, 2010

At a briefing in Washington DC this morning, two very well respected and reasonable economists talked about how the increasing prevalence of chronic diseases and care delivery in outpatient settings are driving up costs in Medicare.  They also asserted that a greater focus on real cost containment - and possibly cost reduction - should be the focus of health reform, and that this could be achieved by increasing team based care coordination and increasing personal responsibility for care and costs, among other focused initiatives that might require political courage…..which one of them noted appears to be currently in short supply.

Their conclusions and analyses are all well reasoned and reasonable, but having listened to these types of analyses and briefings for more than 20 years I was stuck by two things.  First, what they were saying wasn’t significantly different from what people had been saying for, well, more than 20 years.  And second, like most presentations about health reform, they focused on what needs to be changed but didn’t talk about how to create that change - except to focus on altering economic incentives.  (It is worth noting that one of the panelists recommended that government programs such as Medicare should consider not just creating incentives for people and providers to do certain things, (like use electronic medical records),  but rather should say, “if you want to get paid by us, you will do things this way.” Clearly this type of ‘my way or the highway’ approach can be effective, but it also faces much higher political barriers because it could result in a number of doctors and other care providers being excluded from Medicare.)

Motivators Other Than Economic Incentives
What also struck me about their focusing on economic incentive as the driver of change is that this can work for some people and organizations, but in healthcare, there are other factors driving people’s behavior - particularly the behavior of patients and community practicing physicians.  For patients, if they were to act the way economic models would predict, (i.e., always in their best economic interests), everyone would brush their teeth and floss more often, exercise regularly and rarely eat anything that came out of a frozen box or a deep fryer.  But such economic modeling assuming that people act based upon full knowledge AND that their economic interests are the overriding force behind their decisions.  And in the real world, neither of those assumptions are true.

So what’s missing from the health reform prescriptions based upon changing economic incentives for physicians, patients and others?  First,  increasing relevant and useful information can help increase the impact of whatever economic incentives are created.  For example, showing physicians that their practice patterns are different that their local peers can help motivate them to change how they care for certain conditions in ways that economic incentives may not.

And second, non-economic motivators for behavior change can be created that are aligned with  financial incentives (and disincentives) to change actions and attitudes.  These types of motivators are particularly important for individuals - whether they be patients or individual physicians.  In addition, initiatives to change individual behaviors and actions need to recognize the 80-20 rule, where 80% of people go one way and 20% don’t.  In promoting care delivery changes it might be more accurate to call it the 10-70-20 rule, where 10% of clinicians are early adopters, followed by another 70%, with 20% resisting the adoption.  Thus, the key to changing clinical practices at the individual level, (i.e. getting real world clinicians to adopt the care practices of “evidence based medicine” that health reformers talk about), is to get the early adopters to rapidly adopt the better care practices, and for them to become active  teachers and proselytizers for these changes with the receptive 70% of their peers.  (Note: the early adopting 10% are sometimes called change agents or agents of change.)

The remaining 20% who resist change should slowly be convinced by their peers resulting in longer term improvements. And in the shorter term, getting 80% adoption of changed care practices that improve quality and reduce costs would equate to some tremendous improvements for patients and society.

Returning to the Book
How to develop and implement initiatives involving such non-economic motivators and pair them with economic incentives to transform healthcare delivery - resulting in increased quality and reduced costs - is a core part of the book I’ve been writing.  Unfortunately, I’ve been trying to figure out how to make the book relevant within the rapidly evolving health reform environment over the last 2+ years.  Now that the dynamic has shifted back to fiscal responsibility and cost containment, and health policy is all about health politics, it may be time to finish the book so that it will be available for policy makers and stakeholders when health reform initiatives return in 2011 and beyond. If you have any thoughts or suggestions about these issues or the book, please feel free to comment here or contact me at the physical or email addresses on my contact page.

Miscommunicating the Government’s Powers for Health Reform

By Michael D. Miller MD
February 8th, 2010

The Virginia state legislature recently passed a law making it illegal “to require individuals to purchase health insurance.” This action reminded me how commonly the extent of governmental powers are misperceived.

The Virginia legislature’s action follows those in other states, and are in line with the “tea party” groups’ opposition to the general direction of national health reform. But what exactly it means for a government’s actions to be “illegal” is also unclear. And as Tuesday’s Washington Post article on the Virginia bill states, “it would have little practical impact because it would be preempted by federal law.” Thus, the actions in Virginia and other states are more political than substantive, and seem to be more about the states’ laying down markers should they later want to take the Federal government to court over any individual mandates for buying or having insurance.

Powers of the Government
Hidden underneath this political discussion of the “illegality” of health insurance mandates is exactly what the government can and cannot do to force or entice people to do things.  And while academic and legal scholars may take some issues with my simplified description of governmental powers, there are basically four broad options for what governments can do to try and change people’s actions:

1. Attack
Making war, (or other type of overt or covert intervention), is probably the most dramatic of the Federal government’s powers, but presumably doesn’t have a role for health reform and mandates for buying insurance, etc.

2. Incarcerate
The government does a great job of putting people in jail, but I haven’t heard anyone talking about jail time as a penalty for failing to have health insurance.  However, healtcare for prisoners has been a potent political and policy issue at different times.  For example, it was a key message in Harris Wofford’s victorious 1991 special Senate election in Pennsylvania when he noted that if prisoners had a right to healthcare then so should all Americans. And at a much more granular level, there have been cases where prisoners have tried to stay incarcerated so they could get care for health problems because if they were freed they would have been uninsured.

3. Money, Money, Money
Money is the lever governments uses most frequently for non-criminal activities, such as health insurance, housing, food, etc…  At the most basic level governments can either give money, (e.g., tax credits, food stamps), or take it away, (e.g., higher tax rates, fines, penalties, or denial of tax deductions or credits, etc.). And the mechanisms for giving or taking money can be divided between taxes and cash - or cash equivalents like housing vouchers.

For example, in Massachusetts, the individual and employer health insurance “mandates” are enforced by financial penalties, i.e. not jail time.  Similarly, fiscal incentives for individuals and states to have or provide health insurance are very common, e.g. the increase in Federal Medicaid matching rates included in the 2009 stimulus law.

Of course, there are often strings attached to the receipt of money or benefits because neither governments nor private citizens are in the habit of leaving cash in a bag for someone to pick up and do with what they please. That is why government programs have participation requirements just as private contracts have provisions for what must be done before money is exchanged.

4. Talk the Talk
The last tool governments can use to influence actions is the power of the speech, persuasion, and illustrative illumination.  Elected and senior appointed officials have the advantage of having their words amplified through the press. Such officials can also identify individuals and companies who have done good things, as well as not-so-good things.  This type of individual identification can be very powerful, but may also be politically dangerous if praise is directed towards those who has skeletons in their closet, (either literal of figurative), which then become public.

The last type of tool that governments can use to change the world is to use government program operations and purchasing decisions to lead by example. This type of Walk the Walk action is a combination of money and talk, and an example is the State of Massachusetts using their state employees’ health benefits program to advance quality of care by using information about individual physicians to create incentives for employees to go to physicians who are rated the highest in quality. This initiative was controversial but it survived a court challenge in the State, unlike a similar initiative in New York State.

Leading by example is often not as simple as creating targeted economic incentives, because such actions can run into government procurement rules, international treaties, union contracts and other legal limitations on government actions - which may be why this tactic is not commonly used for driving public policy changes.

Conclusions
While the Federal Government has considerable power and resources, the history and legal system of the United States limits governments’ powers so that giving and taking money is the primary tool used to enforce “mandates” and “requirements.” The result is that people, companies and even state and local governments have a choice - comply with the Federal rules and get the money, or don’t and don’t get the money, or maybe even lose some money.  For example, as I noted in my last posting, the State of Arizona didn’t get any Federal matching funds for Medicaid for over 15 years because they chose to not have a Medicaid program.  Similarly, the mandates in Massachusetts for having health insurance are “enforced” by tax penalties for individuals and businesses - although the number of people and companies effected has been relatively small because of the exemptions for smaller companies and affordability for individuals.

Leading by example - either in how they run their internal operations or their procurement/contracting - is an option which governments have used less often to advance specific policies. In a time of fiscal constraints, leading by example might be a good way to leverage limited Federal money and resources - particularly around the contentious issue of health reform where it could help demonstrate the positive value of better healthcare benefits and care delivery for employees, organizations and society.

The Path Forward for National Health Reform

By Michael D. Miller MD
January 31st, 2010

The path forward for health reform is becoming clearer now that the dust from the Democrats losing their 60th vote in the Senate is settling.  While a freestanding, comprehensive law now seems very unlikely, achieving the core goals of health reform are possible via the regular order of a Reconciliation bill, demonstrations and pilot programs, waivers, existing authorities, and the appropriations process.

It’s the Stupid Economy
First, the President has appropriately reraised jobs and the economy to be his highest priority.  This shift may both help defuse the hyperpartisaness that has enveloped health reform, and increase action to improve the economy and create jobs since they are the source of the public’s ongoing angst and frustration.  However, the Administration and Congress should continue to pay attention to health reform since people’s concern over the economy and job-lock are partially driven by worries about the affordability of health insurance and healthcare.  In addition, location-lock for small businesses and entrepreneurs because of different state health insurance laws may be supressing job growth in those sectors… something I recently investigated in moving from Massachusetts to DC.

Reconciliation - Part 1
Second, any action related to health reform will need to embrace fiscal responsibility and deficit reduction.  This clearly points towards a Reconciliation bill that reduces the growth in Medicare spending, (and extends its solvency), along with some Medicaid changes to accommodate increasing enrollment while limiting States’ fiscal exposure in a down economy.  This type of Reconciliation bill would be similar to those that both Democratic and Republican controlled Congresses have passed in the last 20 years.  (In the current political alignment, Democrats will have to counter Republicans’ accusations that they are cutting Medicare rather than just slowing spending growth. Both characterizations are “true” depending on your political objectives.)

Strategic Demonstrations, Pilot Programs and Waivers
Just nipping and tucking at Medicare spending and increasing Medicaid’s enrollment and financial support to the States won’t meet anyone’s definition of health reform.  Therefore, to move the US health system along the path of reform to expand coverage, improve quality and control costs, there are targeted initiatives that the Administration and Congress can pursue to push forward with reforming health delivery and financing:

First the Administration can get much more aggressive with its use of Medicare demonstrations and pilots. These can build upon the HIT and CER programs included in last year’s stimulus bill as stepping stones for health reform.  The Administration already started in this direction with their “Demonstration Grants for the Development, Implementation, and Evaluation of Alternatives to the Current Medical Liability System” announced last September.  Granted this program was designed to provide some cover for Congressional moderates and to probably curry favor with some clinician groups, but the Administration also has the ability - and in some cases the legislative authority - for many other types of demonstrations and pilots.  For example, they could:

  • Proceed rapidly with the Advanced Primary Care (APC) model type of Medical Home demonstration they announced last September - and which I wrote about previously.
  • Resurrect the straightforward Medicare Medical Home demonstration that Congress authorized in 2006 for eight locations. (In 2008 authorization was expanded to as many locations as HHS wants.)  This demonstration was scuttled last fall because the evolving health reform legislation had language replacing it with two new ones.  Since the draft regulations for this program were completed in December 2008, they would just need to be updated and finalized for the program to start later this year or January 2011.  There is also no reason that this Demonstration couldn’t run in parallel with the APC Medical Home demonstration - perhaps in different geographic locations.

For these and other demonstrations and pilot programs, the key for success will be structuring them somewhat like clinical trials so that people and organizations are assessing very similar, if not identical things.  This would not be “cookbook medicine” since these demonstrations should focus on the organization of care delivery and not on individual care decisions. For example, the Medical Home demonstrations mentioned above are about the organization of services provided by primary care practices, not the specific decisions made by clinicians for individual patients.  Similarly, the use of surgical checklists is an operational process that has been shown to reduce errors, increase the quality of care, and reduce costs.  However, it does not specific what procedures the surgeon performs or how the anesthesiologist delivers medicines, etc.

One of the failings of past demonstration programs has been that they have been structured to analyze what people are already doing rather than ways of delivering care that might improve outcomes. For example, the Medicare care coordination demonstration that reported its “conclusions” last year failed to demonstrate very much since it was an evaluation of 15 different types of programs.  In addition, demonstrations are sometimes caught up in significant political and parochial interests.  This was the case for a demonstration program involving “Centers of Excellence” for cardiac care at hospitals.  This demonstration program was scuttled the first time around - and hobbled thereafter - because the hospitals in the demonstration’s geographic locations not deemed “Centers of Excellence” complained quite strongly - particularly to their Members of Congress.

Thus, evaluating what people and organizations are already doing is easy, but may not provide much useful information since care organizations tend to vary greatly in how they operate, even within local areas, so drawing specific conclusions from these types of semi-focused studies is difficult.  Conversely, evaluating specific care practices is harder because it requires changing day to day activities for clinicians and providers, but this type of more controlled experiment can actually demonstrate the value of a change.  And lastly, any of these demonstrations can be undermined by political or parochial forces so that the demonstration is stopped, delayed, or its requirements so diluted that the conclusions are of little value. Thus, to make these demonstrations valuable, career and political officials need to be diligent and have fortitude when they are developing, approving, and overseeing the creation and implementation of such demonstrations and pilots.

Expanded Use of Existing Authority
Once research projects have demonstrated and validated improved ways of delivering care, Medicare, (and possibly Medicaid and other Federal programs), could use their existing authority to pay more for the adoption of these changes - or pay less or not at all when they are not adopted.  For example, Medicare and private payers have stopped paying for so-called “never events,” i.e. clinical events that are completely avoidable and thus should never happen.  Similarly, it is probably within Medicare’s existing authority to not pay - or pay less - for surgeries or the insertion of central intravenous lines when a validated checklist is not used.  These checklists are process steps that have been proven to work and yet have not been universally adopted, which raises the question as to why Medicare is paying for clinical situations where these improvements are not used.

Medicare and Medicaid Waivers
Beyond demonstrations and pilots, and the use of existing authorities, Medicare and Medicaid waivers are other tools that can be used to implement significant changes. Waivers for Medicaid are much more common, and the entire Medicaid program could be viewed as a 50+ bags with 1,000+ waivers.  Technically these waivers are intended to “demonstrate” better ways of running Medicaid programs that would provide information for changing all Medicaid programs across the country.  In practice, these waivers have proliferated like Tribbles in a storage bin of triticale grain, with most States using many waivers for different aspects of their Medicaid programs.  (For example, Arizona didn’t have a Medicaid program until 1982 when it created its program under a statewide waiver. And Massachusetts’ health reform expansion law was only possible because of a revised/renewed Medicaid waiver.)

Medicare waivers are less common than Medicaid waivers, but can be more powerful.  For example,  Maryland’s Medicare waiver has enabled the state to run an all-payer rate setting system for hospitals for many years. And in the near future Massachusetts may be seeking a Medicare waiver to implement an all-payer bundled payment system that their Special Commission recommended last July.  Such a state-wide payment reform system would be an even more dramatic health reform step than the state’s insurance coverage expansion and coverage mandates. But it remains to be seen if the Massachusetts legislature will proceed with this important cost containment and quality improvement step - and if they can get a Medicare waiver when they are ready to ask for it since the Federal Government’s attitude toward such waivers may be different in 2012 or 2014 than it might be today, or was last summer.

Reconciliation - Part 2
It is clear that cost containment for Medicare, expansion of Medicaid, a flurry of demonstrations, pilots, waivers and the use of existing authorities would not constitute significantly health reform since even all together those initiatives would not significantly advance progress towards universal insurance coverage - a fundamental goal of health reform. And one of the criticisms of using the Reconciliation process in the Senate has been that the insurance expansion provisions and coverage mandates in the House and Senate bills would be stripped out under the Reconciliation rules.

However, having successfully included provisions in a Reconciliation bill when I was told that they would definitely be stripped out, I know that under the peculiar rules of Reconciliation all numbers that are the same are are not equal, and there are ways to configure provisions and their implementation to effectively achieve the following:

  • Implement significant and strong regulations/requirements/standards to prevent insurance and coverage denials, and pricing problems that are currently permitted under various loose state laws;
  • Create strong incentives for insurance coverage for most, if not all Americans;
  • Provide subsidies for low income people and small businesses to make health insurance affordable; and
  • Reduce the so-called “donut hole” in the Medicare drug benefit.

The first three of these are really the fundamental parts of health reform, and improving Medicare’s Part D benefit is a widely agreed upon goal. The other aspects of the legislation that was moving through Congress are important, but not really essential - and the public plan option has always been redundant and politically explosive pair of suspenders alongside the belt of strong insurance regulations.  In addition, these provisions are also supported by two of the major industries that could have opposed health reform - insurers and biopharmaceutical companies.

There may be some who would criticize the first three of these changes as causing prices to go up, etc. as they transform the health insurance marketplace in most states, but the reality is that this would replicate what has happened in Massachusetts - first with their insurance reforms in the early 1990s, and more recently with their coverage mandates and expanded low-income subsidies.  And despite some public rhetoric, it is working very well, people like it, and it provides stability and security for insurance coverage.  What it hasn’t done is address costs - which is why the state is looking at an all-payer bundled payment system which would give clinicians, provider organizations, and others  incentives to control spending without being intrusive into their care practices.

Paying for these legislative changes will of course be a challenge, but with a renewed focus on fiscal and social responsibility for the Federal Government and financial institutions, there are innovative ways to have all these health reform changes not result in an increase in the Federal deficit.

Conclusions:

  • The Administration and Congress should be making the economy and jobs their #1 priority, but should continue to work on health reform since health costs and the vagaries of the health insurance system continue to fuel people’s angst about job security and the overall economy.
  • Significant health reform can be done without massive restructuring in one sweeping bill.  Rather coverage can be expanded and costs controlled by constantly pushing and shoving, and massaging and tweaking. Many successful government programs have been built and improved over many decades using such an “incremental” approach - so it is a valid avenue for improving such a complex, multipronged, pervasive, and sinewy “industry” as healthcare.
  • Important and significant provisions were included in last year’s stimulus law, and additional government actions should be viewed as building on those initial steps.
  • Change is hard, but explaining the immediate and long-term benefits for individuals and society will be important for deflecting politically driven mischaracterizations.  In addition, pointing to Massachusetts’ success with insurance regulation and coverage expansion should demonstrate that such changes work in the real world.  And while many other parts of the country point to Massachusetts as a liberal, “Taxachusetts,” socialist enclave, the state’s recent election of Republican Scott Brown to serve the remainder of Ted Kennedy’s Senate seat should fully refute that mischaracterization.  If a state can elect Scott Brown, then they can’t be all that knee-jerk, socialist-liberal.

Next Steps
The next steps in the annual Federal legislative dance will be the release of the President’s budget proposal tomorrow, followed by the start of the Congressional budget process. The two things to remember about the President’s budget proposal are that it was written and locked up before the Massachusetts Senate election, and this document is generally as much about making political points and sending specific messages as it is about the numbers for specific programs and initiatives. That is, within the Administration’s overall 3 year freeze on non-security discretionary spending there will certainly be proposals for program increases and decreases, but it is Congress that actually makes these determinations. Thus many of the numbers and programmatic initiatives in the President’s budget proposal may be designed to score points with specific groups and to force Congress to make the hard decisions about where to get additional funding for its favorite programs that the President’s budget proposes cutting. For those who thought that President Obama would somehow transform or transcend the Washington political process this may come as a bit of a shock, but the reality is that the framework of the Constitution and the evolving nature of the US government and society promote the separation of powers and a balancing act among them, which at times can look something like an uncivil war.

Checklists and Physicians’ Behaviors

By Michael D. Miller MD
January 12th, 2010

I recently heard Dr. Atul Gawande talk about his new book “The Checklist Manifesto.” While the evidence demonstrating the value of checklists for improving the quality of healthcare is increasingly abundant, in his presentation Atul talked about how in a study assessing a surgical checklist they ran into resistance from about 20% of physicians.

Another story he told involved his surgical group’s considering how they might manage bundled reimbursements, e.g. accepting a single payment for all the care and testing related to thyroid cancer surgery.  Their discussions came to a screeching halt when it became clear that this “might” mean less money for each of the surgeons. This uncertainty in personal income arose because accepting bundled payments would require them to distribute money among the people and organizations involved in the actual surgery, the pre and post surgical testing, and the follow-up, which can be a very complicated process.

His group of surgeons probably found this change too daunting because they didn’t have an overarching group/entity to help them assess how to distribute/divide a bundled payment, and actually manage and monitor the money and their financial performance.  While they are part of Partners in Boston - a large integrated health system that includes the  Mass General and Brigham and Women’s hospitals - it seems that Partners hasn’t reached the point of providing this type of support for their individual medical groups.

In the broader world of health deliver reform, to manage such bundled payments effectively physician groups might need to become part of - or affiliate with/have relationships with - medical homes and/or accountable care organizations.  If every group of physicians - particularly in a single specialty - had to figure out on their own how to accept and manage bundled payments, it is very unlikely to work, leaving us with our current perverse incentives of fee-for-service reimbursements that promote volume over quality.

What these two stories have in common is that they involve the barriers to positive transformations of clinical medicine.  Specifically, fee-for-service’s financial incentives give many clinicians few reasons to change to bundled payments or other reimbursement systems that don’t prioritize volume and don’t reward quality outcomes. Similarly, increasing the use of checklists and other care improving protocols faces significant barriers because while they don’t attack clinicians’ incomes, they can be seen as assaulting their professional autonomy.

Change Agents and Care Delivery Transformation
Part of the solution to both these challenges are support mechanisms to assuage clinicians’ concerns about loss of income and autonomy.  The simplest way to conceptualize these support mechanisms is as “Change Agents.”  For bundled payments, clinicians need some trusted group or organization that can help them understand how they will be compensated, what information they will get and how to use it, and how bundled payments may actually simplify their professional lives and even potentially increase their incomes - assuming they can practice more efficiently and effectively. For example, because medical care has become so complicated - with an ever expanding array of advanced diagnostic and therapeutic options - the use of checklists and protocols can help clinicians standardize the routine parts of care and thus cognitively free them up to focus on patients’ individual needs and goals, including how to optimize adherence to treatment plans. These changes will improve clinical outcomes, which is what patients want, and economic outcomes, which is what society wants because it will help stimulate the economy and make it easier to expand insurance coverage and access to care.

While Change Agents to support the successful adoption of bundled payments may be some combination of administrative groups and other clinicians who’ve successfully used the new reimbursement scheme, Change Agents for care innovations are most often other clinicians.  Typically these clinician Change Agents have real world experience showing how the innovation has actually improved the quality of care - particularly by saving an individual life or preventing a specific adverse event. (Dr. Gawande’s research group saw this in their surgical checklist study, and I found this in researching the use of telemedicine in intensive care units.)

Patients as Change Agents
Patients can also be Change Agents.  As I’ve previously written, if patients asked their doctors if they use checklists for things like surgery and inserting central IV lines, and then refused care from physicians (or institutions) that don’t use such checklists, there would likely be rapid adoption of these and other innovations as they are validated and their value communicated broadly.  Advocacy organizations can also fill this role, as can government agencies as part of their quality improvement activities through programs such as Medicare, Medicaid and the Veterans Health Administration - something I’ve also raised in a previous post.

Conclusions
Improving quality and slowing the grow in healthcare costs will require multipronged strategies.  What these strategies will have in common is that they will confront the significant barriers clinicians have in changing how they practice medicine.  Achieving this will require Change Agents - clinicians, patients, advocates, and government agencies who can demonstrate and support the value of care innovations.  Simple? No. Possible? Yes.  But as the pair of old sayings go: If it was easy anyone could do it. And if it was easy, someone would have done it already.

Cost and Coverage c. 1989-91: Part 2 of Historical Perspectives on Health Reform

By Michael D. Miller MD
November 17th, 2009

As I mentioned in my last post, in going through old files I found many memos and articles about health reform.  Some of them from 1989-91 illustrate the long history of the challenge of controlling costs and providing care for more people - and eerie similarities to the current debate:

For example, below are some pieces of text from articles and commentaries published in the New England Journal of Medicine from January 1989 - October 1990:

  • A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 1990.  America’s health care economy is a paradox of excess and deprivation.  We spend more than 11 percent of the gross national product on health care, yet roughly 35 million Americans have no financial protection from medical expenses. To an increasing degree, the present financing system is inflationary, unfair, and wasteful. In its place we need a strategy that addresses the whole system, offers financial protection from health care expenses to all, and promotes the development of economically financing and delivery arrangements. Such a strategy must be designed to be broadly acceptable in our society. To remedy this deprivation, we propose that everyone not covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or some other public program be enabled to buy affordable coverage, either through their employers of through a ‘public sponsor.’ … The U.S. health care economy is inflationary. It is still dominated by fee-for-service payment of doctors and hospitals by third party intermediaries with open-ended sources of finances. There is no total budget set in advance within which providers must manage the care of their patients. For the most part, there is no incentives to find and use medical practices that produce the same health outcome at less cost.” (1/5/89 -  Enthoven and Kronick)
  • A National Health Program for the United States: A Physicians’ Proposal. Our health care system is failing.  Tens of millions of people are uninsured, costs are skyrocketing, and the bureaucracy is expanding. We propose a national health program that would (1) fully cover everyone under a single, comprehensive public insurance program; (2) pay hospitals and nursing homes a total (global) annual amount to cover all operating expenses; (3) fund capital costs through separate appropriations; (4) pay for physicians’ services and ambulatory services in any of three ways: through fee-for-service payments with a simplified fee schedule and mandatory acceptance of the national health program payment as the total payment for a service or procedure (assignment), through global budgets for hospitals and clinics employing salaried physicians, or on a per capita basis (capitation).” (1/12/89 - Himmelstein and Woolhandler)
  • Sounding Board: It Is Time for Universal Access, Not Universal Insurance. … Universal health insurance is not a good idea.  To control goods and services through a single agency - especially when the driving force is economic - would fly in the face of the American way of doing things. … Rather than support such unworkable, soulless programs, I propose universal access through a pluralistic funding mechanism. … So, we ought not to be talking about a universal health insurance scheme, but rather about universal access - access to needed care, on a timely basis, with controls on quality and use that have been accepted by everyone involved.  The key principle of effective access and limited cost is the rationalization of care.  In this age of high-technology medicine and miracle drugs, we must realize that we can no longer do everything for everybody just because it is possible. Rather, we should develop a system in which decisions about what we do, when, where, and to whom are based on reasonable expectations of the benefits involved and on sound medical principles communicated clearly to patients and their families.” (7/6/89 - James Todd, MD - American Medical Association)
  • Special Report: The Pepper Commission Report on Comprehensive Health Care. A look at the outcome of the commission’s deliberations give a good indication of what, in fact, it takes to build political consensus. The commission basically face two separate tasks - reform of the nation’s existing system for insurance medical or health care, and creation of a system for insuring assistance in the task of daily living we call long-term care. The commission voted overwhelmingly (11 to 4) in favor of a major government initiative in long-term care. … By contrast, the commission’s vote on health care reforms - universal coverage for people under the age of 65 (at a cost of $24 billion) and measures to promote the efficient delivery of health care - passed by the slim margin of eight to seven. … The difference between the commission’s votes on long-term care and health care, then reflects the many and pointed political pressures that will work against consensus on health care reform, not for it. … First, and most obvious, the vast majority of commission members face reelection campaigns this fall… … Second, and related, in the wake of the traumatic repeal of Medicare catastrophic coverage, members will remain acutely sensitive to potential voter reaction to any particular reform package. Third, in health care there are entrenched political interests. … Fourth, with a complex issue such as this, consensus on the whole requires many, many concessions on individual provisions. … Finally, outright partisan politics will undermine consensus on health care reform, as the commission found in the days preceding the vote, when the White House placed intense pressure on some members to resist any consensus before the November elections. … If we do not act promptly, I believe our health care system may well implode by the end of the century.   The need for action is starkly clear.” (10/4/90 - Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Chairman of the Pepper Commission)

And other articles from 1991 show similar perspectives on health reform and the urgency for action:

Washington Post, February 17, 1991 “Devising a Cure for High Costs of Health Care: Support Grows for Concept of National Medical Insurance. … The idea [of government-imposed universal health care that would provide quality coverage for everyone], in various forms, is gaining the support of groups ranging on the political spectrum from the AFL-CIO and the American Association of Retired Persons to the National Association of Manufacturers and the American Medical Association.  For the first time since the mid-1970s, supporters of national health insurance believe they have a legitimate chance of winning congressional approval for a universal health care bill, if not this Congress, then the next. ‘This is the best shot we’ve had in 15 years,’ said a key congressional aide. With health care costs climbing more than 20 percent a year for major corporations and even more for many small businesses, disparate political groups are beginning to form a coalition for reform.

USA Today, March 11, 1991 - “Health care costs more, serves fewer.  No other part of the US economy seems less understood than health care.  Few realize why health care costs are so stubbornly high ($2,700 per American per year) or why health care seems to defy free-market economics. … What a growing number of people are coming to know is dissatisfaction with a health care system that absorbs ever-soaring sums of money while letting more and more people fall through the cracks. …  Of all the cold showers of reality falling on the USA as the ’90s dawn, none is as chilling as this: The healthcare system in this country is in deep, deep trouble.”  (Graphic shows that of the 37 million people in the USA without health insurance 49% are working adults.)

Bottom Line - The more things don’t change the more they sound the same.

Next Up: Part 3 - Perspectives from a 1992 Medical School Class “The Crisis in the American Health Care System”

Bending the Cost Curve: Trees and Forests

By Michael D. Miller MD
September 25th, 2009

Bending the curve of cost growth has been a expanding issue within health policy discussions – as opposed to the public plan option, which has increasingly been the focus of political health discussions. Recognizing how important cost growth is to health reform, the September/October issue of Health Affairs is dedicated to this topic, and it contains great articles describing various factors causing spending to grow faster than the GDP or general inflation, and some solutions to this ongoing conundrum.  However, these articles are like trees in the forest, i.e., they are very important, but a close examination of each one doesn’t provide a broad understanding of the whole forest - or in this case, what bending the curve of healthcare cost growth might look like.

Below are summaries of five of the Health Affairs articles - all are worth a close read.  And following that are some illustrations of what bending the curve could look like based upon current projections for healthcare costs, GDP, and inflation.

Trees Within the Forest - High Cost Growth Causes and Cures
Five very interesting articles that describe various aspects of the causes of and cures for health spending growth from the current issue of Health Affairs are:

  • Henry Aaron’s and Paul Ginsburg’s “Is Health Spending Excessive? If So, What Can We Do About It?” is a clear, concise and extremely useful article that would be a great read for students and policy-makers. Their article has two excellent tables. The first covers common questions (and answers) about health spending.  And the second describes the factors contributing to the growth in health spending, (arranged in into the groups of: Demand, Supply, Institutions, and Research), and notes whether policy changes to specific factors within these groups “can or should” reduce the growth in health care spending.
  • Arnold Milstein’s and Elizabeth Gilbertson’s “American Medical Home Runs” describes 4 primary care organizations that have successfully reduced costs without reducing quality. Examining these sites, they found the leaders driving changes had 4 elements in common: persistence, tolerance for risk, instinct for leverage on clinical and economic outcomes, and personal accountability.  (For those who have studied healthcare system and culture change, these elements shouldn’t be too surprising.)
  • John Toussaint’s “Writing the New Playbook for U.S. Health Care: Lessons from Wisconsin” describes the ThedaCare hospital system’s application of the Institute of Healthcare Improvement’s “lean manufacturing” principles, and how it led to dramatic reductions in waste and quality improvement - primarily by using team-based care to eliminate unnecessary steps in care delivery. His article notes that physician culture change was required for this transformation, and that their costs savings benefited payers - including Medicare - but the existing reimbursements system penalizes them for this, since it really creates incentives for waste by paying provider organizations more if they have higher care delivery costs due to wasteful actions.
  • Harold Miller’s “From Volume to Value: Better Ways to Pay for Health Care” is a great companion to Martha Bebinger’s article because it provides a conceptual description for what Massachusetts’ global payment proposal is attempting to achieve,  i.e. moving away from fee-for-service’s volume incentives to a payment system that rewards quality of care within an environment of fiscal responsibility. His Exhibit 1 illustrates how insurance risk can be separated from provider or performance risk – one of the concepts incorporated into Massachusetts’ global payment proposal. And his Exhibit 3 describes why there may be a role for continuing fee-for-service payment for certain types of low-cost, low-variability, high-social value services such as immunizations.  (Overall the mechanisms for implementing global payments reminded me of a book chapter I co-authored in 1995 about bonus pools and incentive payments for physicians, “Preparing for Managed Care and Capitation,” in Alliances: Strategies for Building Integrated Delivery Systems. What has changed in the last 15 years is that quality monitoring capabilities have matured so that relevant data can be captured and analyzed quickly enough to serve as a reasonable basis for making such bonus and incentive payments.)

Forest of Trees - What Bent Cost Curves Might Look Like
While these 5 articles - and the entire issue of Health Affairs - offer great insights into health spending growth in the US, they don’t provide a broad context for what health spending growth and bending the cost curve might look like.  Similarly, while the research and insights provided in the Health Affairs articles are important for health policy decision making, they may not be easily usable within the big-picture policy and political debate.  In other words, these articles are describing specific trees within the healthcare cost growth forest, and what most people need is a better understanding of the entire forest.

Henry Aaron’s and Paul Ginsburg’s article comes closest to painting this overarching view of the cost growth situation and its solutions, but I was somewhat surprised that nowhere in the issue is there a simple graphic showing projected healthcare cost growth and some scenarios for literally “bending the curve.”  Therefore, below are somewhat simple graphs depicting expected future spending growth and various scenarios for bending the curve of healthcare costs.

First, is a figure showing 8 different cost growth curves with the y-axis showing years
(Descriptions of each curve are below the figure)

Bending the Health Care Cost Curve Options - MDMiller-1

  1. Normal
    • 7% Growth Rate (7% was chosen as a flat rate based upon the National Health Expenditure projections, which vary from about 5-7% in the coming years, but are 7.2% for years 2017 and 2018.)
  2. Bent
    •  3% Growth Rate (3% was chosen as a flat rate for what might ideally be desired based upon projections for CPI-W of 2.8% and GDP growth of 4.6-4.9% for years 2011-18.)
  3. Invest to Bend
    • 7% Growth Rate until year 4, then 3%/year
    • 3% Investment Added in Years 1-4 (These investments would be expected to enable the healthcare system to operate at a 3% growth rate in later years.)
  4. Invest to Bend & Innovate
    • 7% Growth Rate until year 4, then, 3%/year
    • 3% Added Years 1-2, 2% in Years 3-4, and 1% added from year 5 onward (This curve is like #3, but the investment amount is reduced to 2% in years 3-4 and then continues at 1% in all subsequent years.)
  5. Cut & Pray
    • 7% growth rate
    • 5% cut first year (One-year cut that doesn’t change long term growth.)
  6. Keep Cutting & Praying
    • 7% growth rate
    • 5% cut 1st year and every 5th year (This is a variant of #5 in that expenditures are cut 5% every 5 years to reduce spending.)
  7. Invest, Then Cut
    • 7% Growth Rate until year 4, then 3%/year
    • 3% additional investment in years 1-4
    • 5% cut in years 6, 9, 12, 15, etc.
      (This is a combination of curves #3 and #6, but the 5% reductions are every 3 years rather than every 5 years.)
  8. Maintenance Investing and Cutting
    • 7% Growth Rate until year 4, then 3%/year
    • 3% additional investment in years 1 & 2
    • 2% additional investment in years 3 & 4
    • 1% additional investment each year after year 4
    • 5% cut in years 6, 9, 12, 15, etc.
      (This is a combination of curves #4 and #6, with a early year investments in system change leading to a 3% baseline growth rate – with an additional 1% added for innovation investment – and 5% cuts every 3 years to reduce waste.)

View of the Forest Depends on the Altitude
Time-frames are an important consideration for evaluating each possible curve.  For example, looking only at the first 9 years doesn’t show much difference from the 7% baseline growth rate for the various scenarios, except for immediately going to a 3% growth rate. (See figure below)

Bending the Health Care Cost Curve - MDMiller-2

However, removing some of the options and expanding the time-frame back to 16 years, shows that three options, (between the projected 7% baseline growth rate and the unrealistic immediate shift to 3%), can achieve dramatic savings. In particular, investing in early years to create a system that can both control cost growth and eliminate waste in the long-run, (Maintenance Investing and Cutting curve scenario), brings us to a cost growth rate that approaches what might have been achieved by immediately going to a 3% growth rate. (See figure below)

Bending the Health Care Cost Curve - MDMiller-3

Of course, the actual dollars spent is a factor of the area under the curve, so the “Maintenance Investing and Cutting” curve does represent more spending on healthcare than some other scenarios - depending upon the time-frame analyzed.  However, up-front investing in health system change has already happened. The Federal stimulus bill passed earlier this year included more than $30 Billion in healthcare system changing investments, which is more than 1% of total annual healthcare spending.*

Actually Bending the Cost Curve Requires Organizational and Culture Changes
The policy and practical challenges for bending the cost curve are choosing and implementing the options that will actually change clinical and reimbursement systems that can get us to the bent curve we want. In addition, convincing the public and millions of people employed in healthcare that these changes are productive and beneficial will also be a great challenge.  And meeting this challenge will require changing organizational cultures and operations, and individual attitudes and actions. Hopefully, graphs like this will help make the case that bending the curve is possible, practical, and palatable.

————–
* The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 included $10 billion in increased funding for the NIH, $19 Billion for health information technology, $1.1 Billion for comparative effectiveness research, $500 million to train primary care clinicians, and $1 billion for several prevention and wellness programs - as well as $86 billion for expansion of Medicaid.